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The Future of the ACP Countries

The record to date of trade and development cooperation between the European Union and the ACP countries has been rather disappointing. Evidently, neither the non-reciprocal trade preferences granted to the ACP countries nor the support for development projects have led to much progress in terms of economic and social development. Can the implementation of the EU's present reform proposals be expected to safeguard the future of the Lomé system and of the ACP countries in the new millenium?

The European Union maintains special cooperative relations with 71 countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific regions (known as the ACP countries). Most of these fit into the World Bank's category of low-income economies, which means they had per capita income levels below \$700 in January 1995. Indeed, 41 of the ACP countries are among the poorest throughout the world. These are often small island nations or land-locked countries. The rate of growth in their per capita incomes, especially in Africa, is low or even negative. Production patterns within their economies tend to be dominated by agriculture and the extraction of raw materials. Accordingly, their exports are concentrated on a few goods. Can countries such as these cope with the future under present-day conditions in the world economy?

Up to now, the special trading and development relations they maintain with the European Union have secured the economic and also the political survival of many ACP countries. This group of countries was not brought together by common political aims, nor does it constitute a regional economic entity. The reasons for its existence are historical: when France and Belgium joined what was then the European Economic Community (EEC), the trade preferences these two metropolitan countries granted to their colonies were passed on to the Community as a whole. Later on, former British colonies also joined the group, and in the course of time a number of other countries in these regions also established special cooperative relations with the EEC and were added in as well.

Still today, trade preferences lie at the heart of the cooperative relations between the ACP countries and what is now the EU. These date back to Article 131 of the Treaty of Rome (1957), and were further devel-

oped in the Yaoundé Conventions (1964, 1971). From 1975 onwards, the trade-policy principles of ACP cooperation, hardly changed from the earlier accords, were anchored in the various versions of the Lomé Convention (I-IV). Basically, the EU provides free access for any industrial goods from the ACP countries and also, within certain limits, for agricultural produce. Certain critical products from ACP countries, such as bananas and rum, actually have positive discrimination applied in their favour relative to imports from third countries. The ACP countries are not required to grant any reciprocal trade preferences to the European Union. These non-reciprocal trade preferences are quite rightly referred to as the 'first pillar' of the system of Lomé agreements.

The 'second pillar' consists of long-term development cooperation between the EU and the ACP countries, largely financed out of the European Development Fund (EDF). The bulk of the projects supported are intended to develop infrastructure and to promote rural development, but there has also been a growing trend towards support for social investment in fields such as health care and education.

In the system as it originally operated under the EC-ACP agreements, once financial commitments had been made to the individual ACP countries funds were released automatically for specific projects that were then jointly administered and monitored by the EC Commission and local governments. As well as direct project promotion, the Lomé Convention system also includes instruments to support the producers of tropical raw materials (STABEX) and mineral products (SYSMIN), both of which groups are very vulnerable to fluctuating world market prices. These instruments include special stabilisation funds to help cushion the impact on incomes of both individual producers and governments. Given that the majority of ACP economies depend on raw material

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exports, this would appear on the face of it to be a worthwhile addition to the system of development cooperation.

The 'third pillar' of the Lomé system, which originally was the least developed of them, consists of institutional political cooperation. In the first instance, these instruments were based on general rules of international law and inter-governmental administrative agreements. In reality, and as one would expect given the economic and political differentials between the EU countries on the one hand and the ACP countries on the other, the relationships have always remained inherently unbalanced. True political 'dialogue' between the two sides of the partnership has been very slow in coming.

The Lomé Convention system has changed over time. The main driving forces behind such changes have been internal policies within the EU, in areas that can be briefly summed up under the headings of the Single Market, Eastward Enlargement and the Agenda 2000 reform programme. Further factors for change have also come from the world economic arena: the conclusion of the GATT Uruguay Round and the foundation of the WTO, coupled with the overall pressures of globalisation, have inevitably had their impact both on the structure of the Lomé system and on the way it operates. Last but not least, arguments for both structural and functional changes in the system have been provided by the cooperation's disappointing record to date. Quite evidently, neither the non-reciprocal trade preferences granted to the ACP countries nor the support for development projects have achieved much progress in terms of economic and social development. As noted above, their growth in per capita incomes has been meagre indeed compared with other developing countries in South America and South-East Asia. Many African countries do not even have the makings of macro-economic stability or of efficient resource allocation on the micro level.¹ Even foreign trade growth in the ACP countries leaves somewhat to be desired: the EU member states' imports from developing countries as a whole increased by 75% between 1988 and 1997, yet the ACP countries sold only 4% more goods and services, by value. Still today, most ACP countries' economies are highly concentrated around just a small number of agricultural crops, minerals or oil. Only a few of them (such as Mauritius, Jamaica, Madagascar, Kenya and Zimbabwe) have performed better thanks to sustained diversification of their exports to the EU.² So does this mean that there is no future for the Lomé Convention system?

The Will to Continue

The Lomé signatories do not share this scepticism. The ACP countries do not want the system to be abandoned since most of them, like it or not, depend on their cooperative arrangements with the EU. For their part, the member states of the European Union and the EU Commission want to stick to the agreements because they represent a unique experiment with comprehensive economic and political cooperation between industrial and developing countries, which is broadly politically motivated without any geographical dimension to it. Thus the signatories all want the Lomé Convention to be reformed before it expires in February 2000, to raise the efficiency of the cooperation and to put some new substance into the political relations among the countries concerned.

The European Commission has published a Green Paper³ outlining 'challenges and options for a new partnership'. Following corresponding resolutions by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, official negotiations began at government level between the ACP countries and the EU in late September 1998. At time of writing (September 1999), these negotiations were making little progress. The parties had not so far achieved any agreement on the key issues of trade cooperation (where changes are proposed to the system of unilateral preferences) and political relations (firmly embedding the principle of good governance as a key component of the Convention).⁴

The motives of the EU's representatives and the objectives or proposed solutions they have been pursuing all relate on the face of it to one or other of the Lomé system's three pillars, namely trade, development cooperation and political cooperation, yet deeper down they are closely connected to one another. Their common features are the intention firstly to transform the largely technocratic coope-

¹ Cf. P. Collier et al.: *The Future of Lomé, Europe's Role in African Growth*, in: *The World Economy*, Vol. 20 (1997), pp. 285-305, esp. pp. 287-92.

² Cf. European Commission, DG VIII, Development: Analytical papers for Group 3 on economic and trade cooperation, No. 1, Analysis of trends in the Lomé Trade Regime..., Summary. CE/TFN/ceec3/09-EN ACP/61/002/99 - http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg08/event/group3_en.htm, 4th August 1999.

³ European Commission: *Green Paper on Relations between the European Union and the ACP Countries on the Eve of the 21st Century*, Luxembourg 1997.

⁴ Cf. European Commission, DG VIII, Development: EU-ACP Negotiation - Information Memos. http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg08/event/negotiation_eu.htm, 4th August 1999. In the meantime some fundamental understanding has been reached between the negotiating parties on 9th December 1999. Cf. *entwicklungspolitische informationen*, No. 12, 1999, p. 6.

ration of the past, addressing specific problems in isolation, into a system of political cooperation, and secondly to move away from the earlier one-sided distribution of rights and duties to a system involving reciprocal responsibilities.

Drastic Changes on Trade

The proposals covering trade cooperation represent a drastic change from the *status quo*.⁵ This is partly a result of the disappointing progress in the ACP countries' external economic situations, as they have signally failed to benefit substantially from the one-way preferential tariffs and other, non-tariff support measures contained in the Lomé system. However, it also results from changes in the overall trade-policy climate that have occurred following the completion of the GATT Uruguay Round. The Lomé Convention system has been allowed to continue in operation only thanks to a WTO waiver, which expires in February 2000. The waiver is unlikely to be extended as criticism within the WTO of the special circumstances for the Lomé system allowed up to now has recently intensified. Thus it will be well nigh impossible to maintain the status quo in the trade-policy field. Then another reason why the EU believes changes to the present trade-policy regime are necessary is that the economic situations of many ACP countries have developed quite differently over time. With this in mind, it would seem appropriate to come up with different trading (and also development) arrangements with different classes of countries, but still within a uniform framework.

In principle, there are three options for reforming the trade cooperation, namely:

- integrating the ACP countries into the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), granted by the EU to all developing countries with the WTO's approval, to promote their exports;
- abandoning the use of one-sided preferences by instituting strict reciprocity via a free trade agreement;
- offering preferences that differ from one group of countries to another, depending on their economic performance, in the context of Regional Economic Partnership Agreements (REPAs).

The first option, of integrating the ACP countries into the GSP, has little to recommend it.⁶ After all, the trading advantages granted to the ACP countries by the current Lomé system are greater than those they would obtain under the Generalised System of Preferences as it stands. If the GSP were to be

improved, that would automatically also benefit all other developing countries entitled to the preferences, leaving no more relative advantages for the ACP countries.

The second option of moving to a system of complete reciprocity is a virtual impossibility, as it would undoubtedly bring severe problems for many poor countries in the ACP group whose economic structures are underdeveloped.

Thus the third option of offering membership in one of several different Economic Partnership Agreements depending on a country's economic capabilities appears to offer the most sensible solution. On this basis, it might be possible to establish a broad reciprocity with relatively competitive countries and groups of countries, allowing only minor variations to cater for sensitive products, while coming to asymmetrical arrangements with weaker countries (or groups), which include a more substantial proportion of one-way preferences during a transitional period. If arrangements of this kind are covered by a 'graduation clause' geared to the amount of progress achieved by the beneficiary countries, there will be a better chance of obtaining another WTO waiver. Any countries not wishing to participate on these conditions would, at least, still have the option of joining the EU's existing Generalised System of Preferences. However, they would probably forfeit the entitlement to be more closely integrated into the uniform framework of the Lomé system.

During the negotiations now in progress, the intention is first to work out a general structure for the Partnership Agreements, to operate for each of the three geographical regions in turn. Starting in 2000, specific agreements will then be worked out with individual regional sub-groups or larger countries, and it is hoped that these will come into force by 2008.

It is interesting to note that these modified liberalisation agreements are also planned to take account of the free movement of services and private-sector investment. For their part, the ACP countries have remained unenthusiastic on these issues, as one would expect.⁷ They are also asking for extended transitional periods to prepare their producers for the intensified competition from EU exports. Finally, they

⁵ Cf. European Commission: Green Paper, op. cit., Ch. V, pt. C.

⁶ European Commission: Analytical Papers ..., op. cit., No. 2: Consequences for the ACP countries of applying the generalised system of preferences (GSP).

⁷ Cf. European Commission: EU-ACP Negotiation – Information Memos, op. cit.

have also been fundamentally sceptical as regards the approach of splitting the countries up into three distinct regions, as it gives them reason to fear that they will no longer be able to represent their interests to the EU as a unified front in future.

More Flexibility in Development Cooperation

Differentiation and flexibility are also the watchwords for the reform proposals in the field of development cooperation.⁸ Once again, practical experience of cooperation between the European Commission and the ACP countries has shown that the recipient countries differ strongly in their institutional capacities, while on the other hand the joint allocation and monitoring of the financial assistance made available from the European Development Fund has tended over time progressively to diminish the effectiveness of development cooperation. As a result, the co-responsibility of ACP governments in designing and implementing development projects has increasingly been called into question, and has been overlaid with short-term exigencies. The European Commission's proposed reform of the allocation procedure and performance monitoring is meant to resolve these problems. First of all, it proposes that the automatic allocation of funds to specific countries or projects based on needs criteria be replaced by a system of master funding allocations for a five-year period based on the recipient countries' own plans. The total funding of the EDF (€13.8 billion) will not be effectively approved until an examination based on both needs criteria and performance has been carried out (in 2004). This is related to experience gained under Lomé IV, which already involves some new rules that, in particular, call for evaluations at the half-way stage. The idea is that the ACP countries, step by step, should assume responsibility for programme management and performance monitoring, and that the coherency of individual projects should be encouraged. The criteria proposed for evaluating development programmes consist partly of needs criteria, reflecting the absolute and relative level of development attained, especially by the poor sections of the population. In addition, though, new criteria are planned to evaluate a project or programme's success in terms of the objectives of sustainable development. The underlying purpose is one of assessing the overall impact of the particular development efforts being made. The assessment ought not to be confined to economic criteria alone, and will also include indicators of a government's overall policy effectiveness.

Further proposals involve cutting back on the large number of special-purpose instruments of financial cooperation and superseding them by a system of total allocations. These proposals particularly address the STABEX and SYSMIN systems for stabilising export earnings, since they are so structurally complex that they have increasingly been failing to fulfil their intended purpose of safeguarding income levels for the producer groups affected by fluctuations in raw material prices. Both mechanisms are therefore to be scrapped in the proposals, and losses of export earnings will be included among the needs criteria applied to the producing countries involved.

In future, sector-specific development programmes will become the general rule, and the aspects most highlighted will be integrating underprivileged sections of the population into a country's economic and social fabric by promoting employment and combating poverty, and encouraging particular industries' structural competitiveness, especially by promoting the private sector.

A final key objective of development activities named in the proposals is that of building institutions and developing administrative capabilities in the ACP countries. Governments will not be able to take up the desired degree of co-responsibility for the design and implementation of development projects unless they have adequate institutional and administrative capacities available at their disposal.

Political Co-responsibility

Co-responsibility is also the main theme underlying the European Commission's proposals on the reform of political cooperation.⁹ Without doubt, this part of the reforms will be the most difficult to implement. For this is where the Lomé system is expected to move on to a new plane, evolving into genuine political cooperation between states that, in principle, have equal rights and duties. The implication of this is that fundamental rules of good governance, democratic involvement of the general public in shaping and supervising the political sphere, the guarantee of human rights and the rule of law, will need to be adhered to by all of the countries working together in the ACP system. In addition, the position of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the private sector in the ACP countries' societies needs to be strengthened.

⁸ Cf. European Commission: Green Paper, op. cit., Ch. VI.

⁹ Cf. European Commission: Green Paper, op. cit., Ch. V, pt. C.

As an institutional buttress to shore up this list of demands, the EU is proposing that these principles should be encapsulated in the new wording of the Convention. Lomé IV already incorporates respect for the rules of democracy, the protection of human rights and the rule of law as essential components of the Convention. In addition, it established that the observance of market principles would guide the conduct of economic and political relations. Now, the principle of good governance is to be ranked equally alongside those of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, thus becoming obligatory for any country in the EU-ACP cooperative system. If ever a country violates any key component of the Convention, the other parties are entitled to impose sanctions on it. The sanctions would be enabled by a 'non-execution clause' which was already included in Lomé IV. The clause speaks of taking 'appropriate measures', up to the complete suspension of cooperation, against a member country offending against these key principles. Normally, consultations would be held with the offending country during a 30-day period before the measures were implemented. However, in urgent cases the other signatories are entitled to impose sanctions without prior consultation.

These rules are ultimately intended to serve as the foundation for a 'commonwealth of values' in the Lomé system, even if on a superficial view they could be interpreted simply as equivalents to the principles of effective cooperation – efficiency, responsibility and transparency – which the EU has set down in its Agenda 2000. In fact, the ACP countries are being obliged to carry out fundamental institutional and political reforms that reach far beyond what would be required of them by the economic liberalisation planned by the new agreements. Accordingly, the ACP countries find these proposals difficult to agree to.¹⁰ So 'good governance' will take its place alongside the REPAs as a thorny issue for the negotiating parties for some time yet.¹¹

Judging the Reform Proposals

What should we make of the European Union's reform proposals? Would they, if implemented, safeguard the future of the Lomé system and hence of the ACP countries in the new millennium? These questions can be answered in terms of whether the proposals make economic sense, are politically desirable, and practically feasible.

The easiest of the proposals to deal with are those on the reform of development cooperation. In this case, the judgement is quite clear: they meet the

requirements both of economic good sense and of political desirability. As funding availability for development work declines and the pressure for good governance increases, it is essential to make more effective use of financial resources and to better define the responsibility for them.

However, it will not be a simple matter to put into practice the proposals as they stand on the 'rolling programming and evaluation' of the governments' programme suggestions for a five-year period.¹² In the first instance, this is liable to give rise to more bureaucracy if the needs and performance criteria on which programme phases' progress to date is evaluated turn out to be too detailed and specific. Collating and interpreting the necessary information can be not only time-consuming but also a drain on personnel and other resources. Thus there is a considerable danger that the evaluation process will lag well behind the proposed two-and-a-half year cycle. That in turn is hardly predestined to improve the efficacy of the programmes under examination, even though it will increase costs. Another consequence if the evaluation is too detailed will be that the ACP countries' governments are 'held on too short a rein' in development-policy terms, creating the opposite effect to that intended in a supposedly 'shared responsibility'. The ACP countries will then not be encouraged to draw up sustainable development programmes on their own initiative. The conclusion to draw is that the indicators used for evaluation purposes ought to be quite generally structured, the evaluation periods ought to be medium-term, and the system of indicators should be built around readily available information.

The initiative and responsibility of the recipient governments should be strengthened by refraining from blocking funds in a bureaucratic way, and by setting up consultative bodies. The point is that abrupt, 'stop-go' changes in the flow of funds, such as may occur as a result of the evaluation process, are liable to generate economic and social instability, also giving governments an incentive to act irresponsibly.

Finally, the envisaged system of programming and evaluation may cause the situation of the least developed ACP countries to deteriorate still further. Lacking administrative capacity and material resour-

¹⁰ Cf. European Commission: EU-ACP Negotiation – Information Memos, op. cit.

¹¹ Cf. *entwicklungspolitische informationen*, No. 7/8, 1999, p. 5.

¹² Cf. P. Collier et al., op. cit., pp. 293-96.

ces as they do, they are unlikely to be in a position to design and implement the programmes they need on their own initiative. With that in mind, the master funding allocations made by the EDF should be divided into two for the protection of these countries. To begin with, a lump-sum budget allocation should be made to the poorest countries in terms of per capita income, to provide them with basic funding. Then, all countries that do well on the new performance measures should be allocated additional funding for high-merit programmes. That would ensure that the funding of poverty-reduction programmes was safeguarded but that incentives were also provided to implement additional programmes as effectively as possible. It might also make sense to add in facilities to fund short-term crisis programmes as a third component in the budget allocation.

The EU's proposed reforms of trade cooperation are a source of considerably more problems. There really is no doubt that the best way of improving the ACP countries' competitiveness on world markets is to move to a system of free trade by asserting the principle of reciprocity in trade relations. Yet on the other hand, it is vital to consider that the poor ACP countries, with their one-sided economic structures, lack any of the preconditions for achieving such a change. Moreover, particularly as a legacy of French colonial rule, there are many countries that still have a pronounced anti-export attitude. For these reasons alone, it would be best to make the transition to open trading rather carefully.

On top of this, the proposed Partnership Agreements will be concluded between unequal parties in economic terms. Readers will be aware that free trade theory predicts increased welfare in the countries involved if trade creation is a large effect relative to trade diversion. The likely impact of the EU-ACP partnerships is that ACP countries' exports into the EU market will grow only slowly whereas the relatively expensive manufactured exports from the EU will rapidly increase their market share in the ACP countries, at the expense of current suppliers from cheaper third countries. Thus, at least temporarily, it seems inevitable that the ACP countries' trade deficits will increase. This is a good reason to be cautious in putting free-trade partnerships into operation.

In this respect, the option of establishing differing preferences for different groups of ACP countries, geared to their economic capabilities and structural flexibility, is indeed the most suitable. Under the circumstances, it probably will not be an attractive proposition to form complete economic-partnership

and free-trade agreements between the EU and individual ACP countries or groups of countries. The more preferable route will be to conclude economic cooperation agreements with groups of countries that are homogeneous in terms of their capabilities, based on a limited degree of reciprocity, and with long transitional periods. The countries concerned ought not to 'graduate' to increased or total reciprocity until these transitional periods are complete and they have attained certain standards of structural competitiveness.

Two preconditions need to be fulfilled before cooperation agreements of this kind could be put into practice. Firstly, they would certainly require a waiver from the WTO before they could take effect. That in turn would mean that the one-way preferences for which the waiver were sought would have to discriminate as little as possible between specific forms of transaction, goods and types of concession.¹³ Certain forms of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), including trading licences and especially anti-dumping measures, would need to be ruled out altogether. On the other hand, it ought to be beneficial to include provisions on the trade in services and the protection of investments and intellectual property in the scope of the agreements.

Secondly, if such agreements are to succeed it will be necessary to establish binding rules that prevent the ACP signatories from undertaking any 'policy reversal' that increased their level of import protection once they have attained a particular reciprocity status. That would boost the credibility of the underlying intention to liberalise, not only in the eyes of the trading partners and potential investors, but also in those of the WTO. That would undoubtedly increase the chances of limited-reciprocity cooperation agreements being granted the waiver they require.¹⁴

Finally, it must be borne in mind that a vital condition to allow such cooperation agreements to function properly is the relevant ACP countries' capacity for structural change. If they do not have that capacity, their supposed graduation to higher levels of reciprocity will not work successfully. Because of this, the cooperation agreements really need to include funding not only for poverty reduction programmes but also especially for programmes to promote competitiveness by structural change. Suitable

¹³ Cf. M. McQueen: *Lomé versus Free Trade Agreements: The Dilemma facing the ACP Countries*, in: *The World Economy*, Vol. 21 (1998), pp. 421-43, esp. pp. 429-33.

¹⁴ Cf. P. Collier et al., *op. cit.*, pp. 298-99.

instruments for this purpose would be the high-merit programmes of financial cooperation mentioned above.

In contrast, the EU's proposals for 'regionalising' trade cooperation deserve to be viewed very sceptically.¹⁵ When it comes down to it, the ACP countries cannot be broken down into uniform economic regions, regardless of whether the emphasis is placed on economic geography or on more social and political aspects.¹⁶ Within the larger geographical groups, there is an extraordinary degree of heterogeneity between poor, structurally weak countries and others that are more prosperous and have more dynamic growth. The same distinctions arise in sub-regions within Africa, too. The only conceivable candidates for partnership regions with a prospect of success might be the West African countries and, to a more limited extent, the Central African countries that already operate a monetary union. All other possible groupings would lack some essential institutional prerequisites. If the composition of partnership groups were tackled the other way round, by grouping countries according to their level of development, that would separate neighbouring countries from one another, thus possibly excluding geographically determined complementary development effects. So there is a lot to be said for linking the efforts to regionalise trade cooperation to the existing sub-regions in today's EU-ACP relations, within which cooperation agreements with differing reciprocity levels should be concluded with individual countries or small groups of them, depending on the structural development and external competitiveness of their economies. Resorting in this way to the sub-regional integration groups traditionally used might also lessen the ACP countries' opposition to the EU's proposal to establish Regional Economic Partnership Agreements.

The Union's proposed measures for deepening political cooperation are, when it comes down to it, a distraction from the underlying problem which renders effective political processes impossible in many ACP countries; indeed, they may even exacerbate the problem. The point is that good governance cannot be imposed by force, no matter how tough the non-compliance clauses in the new Lomé Convention might be, if the institutional basis is not in place and

the incentives are too weak. What is really needed is to encourage institutional innovation by setting up and financing appropriate joint institutions for the purpose within the new system of agreements.

The tasks such institutions might address include reforms in monetary and budgetary policies, improving the legal system (particularly as regards the protection of investors and the regulation of both businesses and the financial sector), and technical and economic advisory services for investors. However, there is also a need to build up both governmental and private-sector capacity for designing, implementing and evaluating development programmes. At present, cooperation between ACP countries and funding institutions both from the EU and from elsewhere is often severely impaired by the poor economic and political conditions 'on the ground' in many places. For lack of appropriate resources, the ACP countries' governments are unable to represent their interests effectively and on a sustained basis in the consultative bodies of the EU and other international institutions such as the WTO. It appears all the more important to promote the building of personnel resources and institutional capacity if we are to take seriously the EU's wish to intensify the political dialogue.

It is not yet clear what results the current negotiations between the EU and the ACP countries' governments will produce. Despite all the problems outlined in this article, it is fair to assume that it is in both the ACP countries' and the EU's interests to arrive at a number of compromises that meet the requirements of making economic sense, and being politically justifiable and practicable.

It is quite possible to share the firm belief of Dieter Frisch, former Director General for Development at the European Commission, that the new Convention – especially in the fields of trade and institutional cooperation – will mark an advance over the forms of the Lomé system so far seen, while at the same time managing to retain and deepen certain 'well proven elements of the culture of Lomé', especially the principle of cooperation between sovereign states on a basis of partnership.¹⁷ Thus the future of the ACP countries is likely to be safeguarded too, particularly by adjusting to changed global economic and political conditions, in a framework of cooperation with the European Union.

¹⁵ Cf. M. McQueen, *op. cit.*, pp. 437-39.

¹⁶ Cf. European Commission: *Analytical Papers ...*, *op. cit.*, No. 3: *Synthesis of the studies of the impact of the EU's REPA proposals on the ACP sub-regions.*

¹⁷ D. Frisch: *Abschied von Lomé – was kommt danach?*, in: *Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit*, Vol. 40 (1999), pp. 272-74, esp. p. 274.